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In this dissertation, we study of the effect of financial constraints on acquisition gains on the 
European market, using for that purpose a sample of European acquisitions made between 1985 
and 2019. The results obtained indicate that the presence of financial constraints on target 
companies increase the abnormal returns for both parties involved in the transaction. Likewise, 
the American market, these findings seems to corroborate the existing literature, that these 
constrained companies once have an injection of capital, or a more unrestricted access to 
external investors (capital markets), unlock previously inaccessible profitable initiatives. This 
creation of value is profitable to the acquiring party, since the employed capital is applied in 
positive net value projects that would most likely perish unexercised if the acquisition failed to 
materialize. 
 











O impacto das restrições financeiras na atividade 






Nesta dissertação, estudamos o efeito que as restrições financeiras têm nos ganhos das 
aquisições no mercado europeu, utilizando para esse propósito uma amostra de aquisições 
realizadas entre 1985 e 2019. Os resultados obtidos indicam que a presença de restrições 
financeiras em empresas adquiridas aumenta o retorno anormal para ambos partidos envolvidos 
na transação. Da mesma forma que o mercado americano, estes resultados parecem corroborar 
a literatura existente, que estas empresas restritas, uma vez que sofrem uma injeção de capital, 
ou um acesso mais irrestrito a investidores externos (mercados de capital), desbloqueiam 
iniciativas rentáveis previamente inacessíveis. Esta criação de valor é rentável para o partido 
adquirente, uma vez que o capital empregado é aplicado em projetos com valor líquido positivo 
que seriam muito provavelmente perecidos inexercitados caso a aquisição falhasse em se 
materializar.  
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The methodology followed in this dissertation verified that the degree of financial constraints 
within a company has a substantial influence on M&A behaviour. With the study conducted, 
we observe that the degree of financial constraints of targeted firms affects the value created 
with the merger and acquisition announcement in the European region. 
By undergoing this empirical analysis, we can infer that the degree of financial limitations on 
acquired firms is one driver of value that investors take advantage of in M&A practices in the 
European region, in line with literature findings in the US market. The univariate tests that we 
undertook show that, when facing an acquisition, if the target is financial constraint, gains tend 
to be materialised by both the bidder and the target across different financial constraint 
definitions. This reality might impel that, investors can look at this reality in order to create 
value ignoring “normal” sources of value. Employing Composite I as the indicator of financial 
constrained targets, the abnormal returns experienced by bidders and targets are 0.80% and 
0.13% higher respectively, around announcement window. Regarding the premium of the 
transaction, no consensus results was obtained, as according to different measures, 
contradictory conclusions could be retrieved. 
The second approach taken, was a multivariate regression on the acquisition gains. The results 
obtained imply that, keeping everything else constant, the level of financial constraints of target 
companies, influences the value created upon an M&A deal to both sides of negotiation table. 
A target labelled constrained according to Composite I Index, observes an abnormal return of 
5.42% around announcement window, with a p-value inferior to 10%, while providing a 
positive 4.98% to the acquirer on the acquisition, with a p-value inferior to 1%. Again, the study 
conducted was unsuccessful to find any significant impact that financial constraints play on the 
acquisition premium, across all measures of financial constraints. 
In order to overview the robustness of conclusions retrieved, acquisitions where matched 
according to the propensity score, being the bidders’ characteristics subject to control, was the 
instrument utilized to test potential endogeneity concerns. The results obtained through that test 
corroborate any spurious signals that could be arisen. Finally, the same analysis was performed 
in a shorter time horizon surrounding the announcement window, being the impact of financial 





Literature Review  
The potential hidden in financially constrained firms has always been one of the priority focus 
of attention by investors, as they perceive these entities to possess within its value chain 
unexploited growth opportunities. In order to determine the factors that are restraining the 
potential of these companies, an extensive literature is existent on the most appropriate 
indicators utilised for identifying financial constraint entities. The bond between financial 
constraints and corporate liquidity demand was shown in previous literature to have direct 
repercussions on firm policies. This aforementioned tie was initially suggested by (Keynes, 
1936), as he stated that one of the most significant upsides of a liquid balance sheet is the 
capability to take on value-added opportunities when they are available. Contrariwise, balance 
sheet liquidity relevance is negatively correlated to the access level firms have external capital 
markets. 
One of the first points bidders aim to bring to the financial constrained acquired entity is an 
increase in liquidity. A driving force behind this injection is related to the mitigation of 
excessive propensity to cash retention, which would ultimately undercut the adoption of 
positive net present value project opportunities in the target entity. Several studies showed that 
firms whose investments opportunities are inhibited by capital market deficiencies manage 
liquidity to maximize value. In contrast, counterparty firms (unconstrained) demonstrated no 
systematic patterns, in four out of five tested empirical proxies, for one-period saving decisions. 
(Almeida, Campello, & Weishbach, 2004). While, the previously mentioned study impels a 
positive correlation between corporate cash flow sensitivity of cash, (Zhang, Chan, & Bao, 
2012) and (Riddick & Whited, 2009) observed that in general terms, the effect observed is, in 
reality, opposing. Once the measurement error in Tobin’s Q is econometrically corrected, the 
sensitive of cash holdings is negative when a firm faces a positive cash flow environment and 
positive when a firm faces negative cash flows. 
This problem of liquidity was analysed by (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1997) wherein their 
framework, a company observes its ability to borrow additional funds severely diminished after 
a severe liquidity shock has emerged. Since at that point, external investors are unwilling to 
provide the necessary funds, the firm must contract the additional loans ex-ante the liquidity 
shock. Even when there are no operational synergies associated with the merger, corporate 
liquidity policy and asset reallocation opportunities proven to be sizeable growth vectors that 
bidder entities pursuit in order to provide value to its shareholders. Focusing on the impact that 
asset specificity plays at the industry and firm level, (Almeida, Campello, & Hackbarth, 2011), 
found that these mergers were more likely to happen when industry-level asset-specificity is 
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high, and firm-level asset-specificity is low. Inducing that the aforementioned acquisitions had 
higher chances to occur in industries whose assets are industry-specific but transferable across 
firms. 
Literature has been contemplating the connection effect between financial constraints and 
corporate policies. Previously proposed by (Fazzari, Hubbard, & Peterson, 1988), they state 
that when firms face financing constraints, investment expenditure will vary according to the 
disposal of internal funds, rather than just the disposal of positive net present value projects. 
Regarding the relationship between financial constraint degree and investment level, (Almeida 
& Campello, 2007) observed direct evidence that the degree of asset tangibility, served as 
collateral, impacts the degree of investment when firms face credit constraints. Since the level 
of pledgeability of the company assets diminishes the credit multiplier of a corporation.  
Regarding the implications that financial constraints have on working capital, (Fazzari & 
Petersen, 1993), stated that when firms face financial constraints, the management of working 
capital represents a source of liquidity used to offset fixed investment relative to cash-flow 
shocks. The presence of financial constraints has also shown to have an economic importance 
effect on inventory management. Firms when facing downturn periods pursue dampening of 
inventory to decrease to the maximum extent capital stagnated and offset the expected decrease 
in the cash flow in the recession periods (Carpenter, Fazzari, & Petersen, 1994) & (Kashyap, 
Lamont, & Stein, 1994). 
The above-mentioned potential has been transforming for a long time financially constrained 
firms’ into desirable additions. During the 1960s merger wave, (Hubbard & Palia, 1999) 
showed that a possible explanation for positive abnormal returns in diversifying acquisitions, 
relied on the inception of internal markets. After analysing 392 bidder firms, the highest returns 
were observed when financially “unconstrained” buyers acquired “constrained” companies. 
The authors found statistical significance on the phenomena that acquiring firms, saw this 
opportunity to create their internal capital markets in the absence of informationally well-
developed external capital markets, by fomenting internal combinations that would permit 
capital reallocation, bypassing external capital markets. Although the majority of positively 
rewarded acquisitions in the 1960s were observed in diversifying operations, the informational 
advantage that buyers were perceived to possess was to be exploited in capital budgeting and 
allocation process as well as in the improvement of operational processes. 
Regarding the post-acquisition capital structure of acquired firms, (Erel, Jang, & Weisbach, 
2015) showed that after acquisitions, financial constraints are reduced in the acquired entities, 
transmitting manager intentions to decrease the cost of capital of the latter. In harmony with 
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our topic of study, these effects were more influential in deals connected with financing 
enhancements. Empirical evidence provided the existence of a tendency to decline their capital 
possessions, their reactivity of cash-to-cash flow and responsiveness to investments while 
expenditure in projects increases in the periods after the acquisition. These findings were 
observed both in diversifying and same-industry acquisitions.  
Concerning the sources of capital, besides the traditional loan contracts, surveys indicate that 
credit lines usage is not restricted only to liquidity management. However, instead, they can be 
utilized to fund growth opportunities (Campello, Graham, & Harvey, 2010). Industry 
practitioners (CFOs), by providing valuable insights in these studies provided more evidence 
on the usage of credit lines as a source of funds in the acquisition process. At the same time, 
cash is utilized as a tool to bear liquidity shortages (Lins, Servaes, & Tufano, 2010). 
The role of excess cash in acquisitions has shown to have acute effects in the behaviour of 
firms. Firms that possess superior amounts of cash-holdings are more likely to engage in 
acquisitions. However, these same agents tend to experience value decreasing due to alleged 
destruction of value due to overpayment of the target (winners’ curse), unsuccessful 
diversification strategies and abnormal declines in operating performance of the business units 
(Harford, 1999). For this reason, if the amount of cash available is a proxy for financial 
constraint, as the cash available is commonly argued to help to a significant extent a company 
sustain adverse shocks and is an indicator of stable corporate governance structures (Harford, 
Mansi, & Maxwell, 2008) & (Dittmar & Mahrt-Smith, 2007). One could expect to verify the 
same results as the previously mentioned studies found. Though, the inaccurate identification 
could occur due to a multiplicity of factors. After all, the liquidity management of each 
company differs within intra-industry and between industry standards, as the appetite for risk 
and return maximization measures are unique to a corporation.  
Another verge to which financial constraints have proven to be relevant is related to the decision 
of acquisition of minority positions. Notwithstanding the perceived value gains are easier 
accomplished on majority acquisitions through the expected joint productions synergies. 
Minority acquisitions tend to be the adopted methodology when the full combination of internal 
capital markets translates into a higher cost and consequent dilution of the EPS of the acquirer.  
The authors (Ouimet, 2012) & (Hertzel & Smith, 1993) suggested that minority acquisitions 
can be the recommended tool to certify the target and provide direct financing. By doing such, 
it allows an investor to get a more unobstructed view on the target investment opportunities and 
the expected synergies that a merger would provide. Henceforth, acting as an optimal investor 
before committing to a majority stake. In the same study, direct evidence emerged that minority 
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acquisitions are more frequent when the preservation of unscathed target managerial incentives 
is essential, when the target is financial constraint or can leverage on certification. 
Financial constraints have also been an object of study for their impacts on relationship 
governance. The authors (Fee, Hadlock, & Thomas, 2006), observed that suppliers who are 
producing negative free cash flows are more likely to have in its ownership structure equity 
blocks by their primary customers. This finding is inherent to the consideration of equity stake 
phenomenon, where customers serve as informed sources of capital, easing financial constraints 
at the supplier level. With the same intent as our study, (Liao, 2014) found that companies who 
sold minority equity stakes, with intent to relieve capital constraints experienced higher 
financial returns upon announcement, outperforming their most direct competitors. However, 
the focus of the study conducted in this thesis is on the acquisitions of majority block positions, 
where the acquirer obtains 50% or more equity stake upon the transaction agreement. To be 
noticed, this study differentiates itself from the above-mentioned studies, since it is analysed 
the role of both bidder and target financial constraints in the merger and acquisition process. 
The impact of financial constraints on value creation, was also explored by (Khatami, Marchica, 
& Mura, 2015) in the US market, where the authors found that the existence of financial 
limitations on acquired companies increased the abnormal returns significantly for both parties 
and acquisition premiums. Besides, a secondary analysis conducted in the above mentioned 
study, observed that one factor that increases the likelihood for a company to receive a takeover 
bid is to be under financial constraints.   
The impact of financial limitations on M&A practices was analysed on an assortment of 
completed acquisitions utilizing a plurality of variables that have shown in previous empirical 
studies to provide with high precision the existence of financial constraints in a company. The 
level of financial restrictions of both acquirers and targets were computed on the five indicators, 
being those well accepted within the academic community: 
 
i) Composite I & II advanced by (Campello & Chen, 2010). The authors found that these 
measures reflected the degree to which financial constraint companies stock have higher 
systematic risk. The latter, experience excessive procyclicality on their business fundamentals, 
being more sensitive to macroeconomic movements than their counterparties. Thus, such 
factors are priced in the financial markets. Financial constraints firms endure more significant 
losses in downturns periods and see their access to credit limited, while experimenting steeper 




ii) The payout ratio utilized by (Fazzari, Hubbard, & Peterson, 1988), on which “financing 
hierarchy” and tax reform are utilized to explore the sensitivity of investment spending 
regarding the availability of internal finance, being the effect more incisive in financial 
constraint firms. The presence of financial constraints was found to have repercussions in 
industrial organization, with multiple mergers being the unification result of firms with different 
cost of capital on the margin because of diverse earnings and growth forecasts. 
 
iii) The Kaplan and Zingales (KZ) index utilized by (Lamont, Polk, & Saaá-Requejo, 2001), to 
investigate whether the impact of financial constraints on firm value is observable in stock 
returns. Unlike (Campello & Chen, 2010), the empirical analysis undergone in this study argued 
that financially constrained firms, once accounted for the leverage burden and size effect in 
security pricing, do not show returns significantly more cyclical than the average. 
 
iv) The HP index proposed (Hadlock & Pierce, 2010), an evolution from the KZ index, since 
this new measure incorporates both firm size and age for predicting financial constraint level. 
These emerged as the alternatives measures that increased the prediction accuracy of the 
distress factor to a greater extent. 
 
Data and Sample Selection  
In order to extract the acquisition information regarding the deals performed in the European 
region, Thomson One Investment Banking database was utilized. In order to study the 
premiums and gains relative to the transactions, we maintained the approach to utilize only 
acquisition deals that involved both public listed parties and that where announced between 
1985 and 2019. For the extraction of accounting data, Datastream was the selected database. 
To retrieve daily securities prices, Datastream was also used in order to compute abnormal 
returns and premiums. To identify, whenever a possible business cycle was present, guidance 
was retrieved from the indications of the European Central Bank (ECB) Macroeconomic cycles 
article. The OECD website was the database used to extract the inflation levels of the European 
region throughout the time window of this thesis. Regarding the financial constraint measures 
that require the availability of company bond and commercial paper ratings, for the European 
region, no reliable database was utilized due to the substantial absence of information for the 
desired variable. Due to this data insufficiency, adjustments were made in the respective 
financial constraints proxies to adapt to the data availability. 
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From the deals announced, the companies classified as financial institutions (SIC 6000-6999) 
plus supervised utility entities (SIC 4909-4939) were removed from the data arrangement since 
these businesses’ activities are subject to a hefty regulatory burden by the governments. 
Regarding the availability of data, for a deal to be considered an observation for this study, 
accounting and share price data must be available for bidders and targets one year prior to the 
acquisition announcement date.  
The first requirement regarding the value of the transaction, comprehends the relation between 
the bidder’s market capitalization and deal value. When the ratio of deal value to bidder’s 
market capitalization 43 days prior to the announcement is inferior to 1%, this transaction is 
removed from the sample. In addition, a second restriction was imposed on the transaction 
value. Transactions whose deal value was inferior to $1 m where excluded. These two criteria 
were included, with the concern that the companies included within these criteria, would be in 
imminent default situations or recently launched companies. Both these situations are not 
intended to be covered with the analysis of this study. The various requirements imposed 
yielded a sample of acquisition announcements consisting of 1045 observations made in the 
European region between 1985 and 2019, where both parties involved were publicly listed 
companies and the stake intended in the target upon the deal completion was higher than 50%. 
Concerning the overview of the gains realized from acquisitions, in this study, the acquisition 
premium of the transaction and the target and bidder cumulated abnormal returns (CARs) are 
analysed around the observation window. To compute the acquisition premium, the 
methodology conducted by (Schwert G. W., 1996) was adopted, where it was concluded that 
the manifestations of rumours and news surrounding a takeover start to be reflected in the 42nd 
day preceding the initial bid. Taking this into account, the acquisition premium is extracted 
through the ratio of the bid proposed to the target company shareholders by the market value of 
the target (or the percentage intended to acquirer) 43 days prior to the announcement date. For 
the premium impelled to be considered, it must be between 0 and 2, if this requirement is not 
met, the observation is retrieved from our final data sample.  
The observation window that was utilized in this analysis to compute the cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) was based on 11-day (-5 to +5) around the announcement day. Whenever price 
data is absent, the observation is removed from the sample. Taking into consideration (Schwert 
G. W., 1996), the estimation period utilized to compute the expect return is comprehended 
between the interval of [-316, -43] days precedent the announcement date. To extract the 
expected returns on the market, the Fama French European 3 factor model was the benchmark 




Measures of Financial Constraints 
The process of identifying a company under financial distress situation has proven to be a topic 
where no general agreement has yet been achieved on which measure is the best proxy to 
classify a company under such financial status. Existing literature has suggested a plurality of 
methodologies to categorize the level of financial constraint confronted by firms. When 
overviewing the proposed approaches on discrete measures such as the availability of bonds or 
the commercial paper rating, one should be cautious regarding the availability of information 
and whether they are likely to contaminate the study conducted by inducing noise into 
classification. Another problem that is inherent to the literature, concerns the peculiarity that 
some authors opt to focus on a specific aspect of what is perceived a broader concept of financial 
constraints, e.g. size, dividend payout and age (Fazzari, Hubbard, & Peterson, 1988) (Guariglia, 
2008) (Schiantarelli, 1996). With the same concern, (Almeida, Campello, & Weishbach, 2004) 
found that “the KZ index generates constrained/unconstrained firm assignments that are mostly 
negative correlated with those of the other […] classification criteria”. In order to improve the 
reliability of such indexes suggested in the literature, recent papers have induced more 
trustworthy alternatives, like (Hadlock & Pierce, 2010) on the Kaplan-Zingales (KZ index), 
where the flaw in the incorporation of information into both the dependent and independent 
variable was arranged. The authors showed that the size of the entity is the only input from the 
Whited-Wu (WW) index that could improve the existing KZ index.  
The chosen variables to identify financial constraints are in great majority proposed by 
(Campello & Chen, 2010), with the intent to diminish to the maximum extent the possible 
limitations described above. 
 
1.1 Composite I Index 
Propesed by (Campello & Chen, 2010), the sample of companies collected from DataStream 
was arranged according to the four indicators: size, interest coverage ratio, dividend payout 
ratio and the KZ index discretely1. (In Appendix I is described the characterization of the 
methodology encompassed in the respective financial limitator indicator). After this 
arrangement, a score encompassed between the range [0,5] is allocated for the respective 
                                                          
1 This approach raises a possible problem regarding the classification process, since the sample 
is limited to the companies involved in M&A we are inducing a considerable bias into the 
analysis since the aforementioned companies possibly will possess different characteristics 
from the entire population. 
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distribution. In (Khatami, Marchica, & Mura, 2015), the next procedure, it is allocated a score 
based on the extremes of the previously mentioned range, 0 and 5, for the set of corporations 
that at the time of the deal announcement possessed commercial paper rating and bond rating 
separately. However, due to the insufficiency mentioned above in the data source, in this study, 
a divergence was taken. The new requisite impelled a company to have on minimum three of 
the above four criteria available to avoid our sample to be drastically reduced. In contrast, in 
the original paper, the requisite was the existence of four variables of the above mentioned six 
criteria.  
In order to attribute a comprehensive score to an observation, the significance of each rank was 
computed taking into the accordance the availability of inputs. The procedure followed implies 
that the lower the score of a firm, the higher the financial constraints. Firms above the 70th 
percentile are classified as unconstrained companies while the firms below the 30th percentile 
classified as financially constrained companies.  
 
1.2 Composite II index 
The procedure to compute Composite II is the same as the Composite I, but the KZ index and 
size factors are excluded. The rationale behind this removal is that KZ index and size factors 
sporadically provides a contrasting classification to the remaining measures (Almeida, 
Campello, & Weishbach, 2004). To be noticed that size is used as an explanatory input in the 
regression undertaken in chapter 3. In the same way as the previous measure, the firms above 
the 70th percentile classified as unconstrained companies while the firms below the 30th 
percentile classified as financially constrained companies. 
 
1.3 Alternative Measures 
With the intent to observe the degree of effectiveness or to wish the latter two measures are 
punitive in the classification of companies. Three additional variables are utilized to classify 
financial constraints to counterbalance such effect: the KZ index, the dividend payout ratio and 
the (HP) index (Hadlock & Pierce, 2010). Likewise, the labelling criteria maintains as firms 
above the 70th percentile classified as unconstrained companies while firms below the 30th 
percentile classified as financially constrained companies. (In Appendix I it is described the 
characterizations of each variable encompassed in these three financial constraint measures) 
 
Throughout this thesis, and in order to improve the accessibility and interpretation of 
information, several acronyms are utilized to characterize the multiple classes of acquisitions: 
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“B” intends for bidder, “T” intends for target, “NFC” intends for “Not Financially Constrained” 
and “FC” intends for “Financially Constrained”. 
 
Panel I 
Allocation of the sample according to the level of financial constraints on the five tested 
variables chosen for indicating financial limitations. This panel shows the distribution of 
transactions in the collected data set, according to the degree of financial limitations present in 
both parties involved. The observed data set encompasses all European transactions concerning 
public companies, being the target and bidder, both publicly listed, in the chronological interval 
between 1985 and 2019 present in the Thomson One Banker database. Bidders and targets that 
belonged to the financial and regulated utility industries were removed from the studied sample. 
%TFC indicates the portion of transactions whose target is constrained in agreement with the 
respective indicator of financial constrain, %BFC indicates the portion of transactions whose 
acquirer is constrained in agreement with the respective indicator of financial constrain. The 
methodology adopted in the indicators of financial constraints is reported thoroughly in 
Appendix I. 
 
 TFC TNFC %TFC BFC BNFC %BFC 
Composite I Index 176 83 44.11 70 199 17.90 
Composite II Index 30 20 60.00 16 25 39.02 
Payout ratio 201 190 43.70 154 163 35.81 
KZ 141 109 35.43 139 170 29.39 
HP 347 295 46.77 322 385 34.55 
 
From Panel I, it is possible to observe the amount of transactions that are categorised as 
constrained or unconstrained according to each financial constraint measure tested for both the 
targets and bidders’ groups. Looking at the classification, only Composite II Index fails to 
classify a sizeable amount of companies as constrained or unconstrained due to deficiency in 
data availability regarding the interest expense of each company.  Due to the aforementioned 
reason, the analysis of Composite II indicator was removed from the following panels since any 
conclusions retrieved could spurious the findings of the other measures and did not present 
statistical significance in any variables that were object of study. 
Looking at the allocation of constrained targets in our data set, we observe that across all 
measures, the number of constrained targets outnumber the number of unconstrained targets. If 
we make the same analysis, but observing through bidders’ perspective, we observe symmetric 
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results, since, across all measures, the number of deals occurred that had an unconstrained 
bidder surpass the acquisitions where the bidder was constrained. From this allocation, it could 
be argued that companies who possess a more efficient/higher-quality access to capital and 
suffer from a lack of in-house organic growth opportunities with a positive net present value, 
see the process of mergers and acquisitions as the right tool to propel growth in their business 
strategy.   
12 
 
Panel II – Firm and deal characteristics - Targets 
Sample Statistics. This panel illustrates transaction features and corporation aspects, according to the degree of financial constraints of the 
acquired companies. The variables for the company were computed according the financial report of the year preceding the deal announcement. 
The p-values are extracted from the t-tests of equality between the averages of the two sub-classifications. 
 Composite I Index  Payout Ratio 
 TFC TNFC p-Value  TFC TNFC p-Value 
Company Level        
Total Assets (€m) 246.82 2751.83 0.061  1078.36 1118.71 0.480 
Sales (€m) 214.42 1920.46 0.017  783.56 635.00 0.349 
Cost of debt  0.109 0.074 0.031  0.104 0.055 0.120 
Coverage ratio -2.83 27.19 0.029  19.01 1.10 0.122 
Total debt/BVE  0.51 0.44 0.327  1.28 2.77 0.283 
Tobin’s Q 1.48 2.44 0.276  1.61 2.80 0.129 
Cash holding/PPE 3.62 1.52 0.011  4.77 3.06 0.142 
CapEx/TA  0.07 0.07 0.412  0.07 0.06 0.479 
PPE/TA 0.27 0.40 0.000  0.25 0.39 0.000 
Observations 176 83   201 190  
        
Deal Level        
Transaction value (€m) 125.07 498.67 0.000  158.04 239.45 0.052 
Diversifying (%) 42.61 45.78 0.317  38.81 54.21 0.001 
Percentage Sought (%) 91.91 93.67 0.158  91.21 95.75 0.000 
Hostile (%) 0.57 0.00 0.000  0.50 1.58 0.148 
Of cash (%) 45.45 51.81 0.784  48.76 46.32 0.83 
Of stock (%) 57.39 54.21 0.721  52.24 58.42 0.631 
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Panel II– Firm and deal characteristics - Targets (Continuation) 
Sample Statistics. This panel illustrates transaction features and corporation aspects, according to the degree of financial constraints of the 
acquired companies. The variables for the company were computed according the financial report of the year preceding the deal announcement. 
The p-values are extracted from the t-tests of equality between the averages of the two sub-classifications. 
 KZ  HP 
 TFC TNFC p-Value  TFC TNFC p-Value 
Company Level        
Total Assets (€m) 320.99 2042.80 0.040  217.10 1750.80 0.000 
Sales (€m) 447.74 1343.31 0.051  178.39 1231.76 0.000 
Cost of debt  0.057 0.052 0.400  0.092 0.052 0.098 
Coverage ratio 9.52 5.12 0.220  14.40 16.91 0.421 
Total debt/BVE  4.66 0.10 0.082  2.98 0.39 0.114 
Tobin’s Q 1.88 2.67 0.001  1.84 2.55 0.000 
Cash holding/PPE 1.76 9.26 0.002  3.81 2.10 0.055 
CapEx/TA  0.06 0.07 0.446  0.06 0.08 0.087 
PPE/TA 0.41 0.17 0.000  0.25 0.36 0.000 
Observations 141 109   347 295  
        
Deal Level        
Transaction value (€m) 188.95 265.98 0.137  345.55 115.16 0.000 
Diversifying (%) 36.88 54.13 0.003  43.73 51.30 0.028 
Percentage Sought (%) 90.55 96.83 0.000  91.93 92.86 0.195 
Hostile (%) 0.71 0.00 0.159  1.15 1.36 0.409 
Of cash (%) 46.81 53.21 0.712  31.12 48.14 0.164 
Of stock (%) 56.74 57.80 0.934  69.45 54.24 0.252 
14 
 
Panel II– Firm and deal characteristics - Bidders 
Sample Statistics. This panel illustrates transaction features and corporation aspects, according to the degree of financial constraints of the 
acquiring companies. The variables for the company were computed according the financial report of the year preceding the deal announcement. 
The p-values are extracted from the t-tests of equality between the averages of the two sub-classifications. 
 Composite I Index  Payout Ratio 
 BFC BNFC p-Value  BFC BNFC p-Value 
Company Level        
Total Assets (€m) 457.29 20379.14 0.001  9410.88 10361.64 0.000 
Sales (€m) 411.86 13221.93 0.000  6445.36 6608.25 0.000 
Cost of debt  0.148 0.070 0.104  0.134 0.069 0.120 
Coverage ratio 4.75 11.41 0.030  3.50 6.30 0.160 
Total debt/BVE  3.38 0.35 0.060  3.79 0.53 0.231 
Tobin’s Q 1.87 3.53 0.005  2.03 3.73 0.006 
Cash holding/PPE 4.77 2.63 0.147  2.16 3.41 0.128 
CapEx/TA  0.05 0.12 0.056  0.08 0.08 0.241 
PPE/TA 0.27 0.35 0.015  0.30 0.37 0.000 
Observations 70 199   154 163  
        
Deal Level        
Transaction value (€m) 74.64 302.30 0.000  155.68 170.63 0.000 
Diversifying (%) 44.29 47.24 0.338  41.56 39.26 0.021 
Percentage Sought (%) 89.95 94.33 0.013  89.50 96.69 0.373 
Hostile (%) 0.00 2.01 0.035  2.60 2.45 0.117 
Of cash (%) 21.43 55.28 0.032  38.31 46.01 0.048 
Of stock (%) 80.00 45.23 0.000  62.34 54.60 0.022 
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Panel II – Firm and deal characteristics - Bidders (Continuation) 
Sample Statistics. This panel illustrates transaction features and corporation aspects, according to the degree of financial constraints of the 
acquiring companies. The variables for the company were computed according the financial report of the year preceding the deal announcement. 
The p-values are extracted from the t-tests of equality between the averages of the two sub-classifications. 
 KZ  HP 
 BFC BNFC p-Value  BFC BNFC p-Value 
Company Level        
Total Assets (€m) 12276.68 3884.51 0.031  3089.42 11951.24 0.000 
Sales (€m) 9106.03 3239.65 0.019  2348.66 7807.70 0.000 
Cost of debt  0.122 0.067 0.152  0.120 0.070 0.120 
Coverage ratio 6.22 21.62 0.074  6.01 17.68 0.160 
Total debt/BVE  6.90 0.18 0.028  1.61 3.15 0.231 
Tobin’s Q 2.79 3.36 0.447  2.80 3.86 0.006 
Cash holding/PPE 5.05 6.49 0.195  5.31 3.02 0.128 
CapEx/TA  0.08 0.13 0.213  0.14 0.10 0.241 
PPE/TA 0.46 0.20 0.000  0.25 0.37 0.000 
Observations 139 170   322 385  
        
Deal Level        
Transaction value (€m) 185.68 241.45 0.177  281.73 107.55 0.000 
Diversifying (%) 43.88 49.41 0.167  48.14 40.52 0.021 
Percentage Sought (%) 90.79 95.21 0.002  92.34 92.68 0.373 
Hostile (%) 1.44 2.94 0.181  1.55 2.86 0.117 
Of cash (%) 46.76 43.53 0.610  24.84 57.14 0.048 




This panel illustrates mean values of gains at both the target and bidder level according to the 
different allocation methods for financial constraints, at targets (A) and bidders (B). The p-
values are derived from the t-tests of equality between the averages of the two sub-
classifications. 
 
A – Targets’ financial constraints 
 Composite I Index  Payout Ratio 
 TFC TNFC Diff. p-Value  TFC TNFC Diff. p-Value 
Premium (%) 43.16 64.60 -21.44 0.002  44.13 47.32 -3.18 0.267 
Target CAR (%) 17.39 17.27 0.13 0.968  16.09 15.84 0.25 0.462 
Bidder CAR (%) -0.16 -0.97 0.80 0.205  0.06 0.02 0.04 0.480 
 
  KZ  HP 
 TFC TNFC Diff. p-Value  TFC TNFC Diff. p-Value 
Premium (%) 45.64 52.70 -7.06 0.154  51.57 34.47 17.10 0.000 
Target CAR (%) 15.40 14.88 0.52 0.436  15.51 17.35 -1.84 0.190 
Bidder CAR (%) 0.69 -0.43 1.12 0.161  0.08 0.96 -0.88 0.085 
 
B - Bidders’ financial constraints 
 Composite I Index  Payout Ratio 
 BFC BNFC Diff. p-Value  BFC BNFC Diff. p-Value 
Premium (%) 37.54 53.26 -15.71 0.012  38.10 44.77 -6.67 0.113 
Target CAR (%) 12.86 15.18 -2.31 0.274  14.61 16.16 -1.55 0.289 
Bidder CAR (%) 1.31 -0.44 1.75 0.055  1.08 -0.49 1.57 0.068 
 
 KZ  HP 
 BFC BNFC Diff. p-Value  BFC BNFC Diff. p-Value 
Premium (%) 45.94 46.66 -0.73 0.451  47.93 35.62 12.31 0.000 
Target CAR (%) 10.05 17.07 -7.02 0.006  16.10 13.45 2.65 0.079 
Bidder CAR (%) 0.79 -0.21 1.00 0.155  0.57 0.63 -0.07 0.458 
 
2. Discriminant Analysis   
Before overviewing the relevance of financial constraints, a univariate analysis was conducted 
in order to see to which point the different indicators for financial constraints, yielded data sets 
with sizable differences between companies. Panel II highlights accounting characteristics at 
deal and company level for targets and bidders correspondingly. The information highlighted 
in the tables is extracted from the annual financial report preceding the deal announcement. 
Regardless of the conditions considered for yielding the classification, sizable differences were 
found between the constrained and unconstrained groups.  
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Like it was found in North America, when the payout ratio is utilized as the defining measure, 
bidders and targets show characteristics that resemble more one group to other. One possible 
cause to this result might be driven by the fact that a considerable portion of companies opt not 
to distribute dividends, allocating them as constrained companies without taking into 
consideration no additional information. 
Furthermore, the European market data seems to follow the literature already existent, 
(Khatami, Marchica, & Mura, 2015), (Hadlock & Pierce, 2010) and a plurality of other authors, 
regarding the classification results of KZ index. The resulting allocation of companies, when 
compared with other measures, differ in some financial indicators. When using KZ, constrained 
companies hoard relatively more tangible assets and cash reserves, as it is observed in the US. 
The first immediate difference that it is possible to infer is that targets, whenever they are 
classified constrained are on average smaller in terms of book value of assets and revenue. This 
target group is also aligned with higher interest expenses and lower interest coverage ratios. 
These findings are in line with the study conducted in the United States market. However, when 
undergoing the same analysis on the bidders’ group, the results are quite puzzling since using 
all the measures apart from KZ, bidders tend to be smaller in terms of total assets and revenues 
when they are financially constrained. These results that are not encountered in the United 
States market. Regarding Tobin’s Q, unconstrained companies present a higher value as their 
market valuation tends to be higher. When analysing the cash reserves company hold, 
constrained companies tend to garner higher cash holdings, to mitigate possible funding 
problems, arising from information asymmetries with external investors. Therefore, these 
companies are better prepared to undertake possible investment opportunities or liquidity 
shortages (Almeida, Campello, & Weishbach, 2004). 
Concerning their capital expenditure, in the targets group, no statistically significant difference 
is present. On the other hand, the investment is more significant in the bidders’ unconstrained 
group, which might reflect either their growth strategy, more profitable investment 
opportunities or the fact that external capital markets are backing more favourably their 
investment/expansion strategy. One could also try to explain this finding with the maturity of 
their business cycle. However, if we use as a proxy the level of tangible assets as a total portion 
of total assets as a positive indicator, it would refute such reasoning.  
Examining the deals’ nature, there are multiple similarities with the US as constrained targets 
tend to be acquired more through stock offering than cash payment. In addition, these are lesser 
involved in hostile acquisitions. Shifting to the other side of the negotiation table, unconstrained 
acquirers appear to carry out with more frequency diversifying transactions and hostile 
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takeovers, which could be driven by empire-building tendencies. In addition, they tend to recur 
more to cash to pursue deals conclusions to mitigate synergies dilution. Moreover, whenever a 
party involved is considered unconstrained, the percentage sought after the deal completion is 
superior, which could indicate the degree of confidence in the transaction potential to be greater.  
Panel III addresses premiums and abnormal returns materialized for bidders and targets on the 
data set. In order to better explore the possible value drivers, the aforementioned measures are 
explored starting from the target financial constraints (Section A) and bidder financial 
constraints (Section B). 
Overviewing section A, there is a trend, which suggests unconstrained targets experience higher 
premiums, except when using the HP measure. These results are symmetrical to the ones 
observed in the US market, inducing a shift on investors’ behaviour when analysing a possible 
acquisition to the company’ portfolio. Regarding the CAR realized by the targets, there is some 
degree of ambiguity between different indicators, with different results arising from different 
definitions of financial constraint. Being this the situation encountered, no unbreakable 
conclusion can be retrieved from our findings. Contrarily, on the bidders’ side, the European 
market behaves like its American counterparty. Whenever a bidder acquires a constrained target 
it observes greater gains in all measures except HP. This report is in line with the previous 
literature regarding the unexploited potential perceived to be present in constrained companies. 
However, having this said, the data utilized is not robust enough in any allocation measure 
utilized to foment statistical evidence in the three studied campus.  
Shifting towards section B, all measures apart from HP indicate that whenever the bidder in the 
transaction is considered unconstrained, the premium associated with the transaction is higher. 
This fact can be explained by two drivers, first since they are considered unconstrained, they 
can more easily inflate their offering driving the deal value up, as lenders are willing to back-
up these initiatives with more confidence. Secondly, these companies can be pursuing mostly 
unconstrained targets, that were shown in the previous paragraph to be aligned with higher 
acquisition premiums. The behaviour on the bidder and target gains is the same as described in 
the section A. 
Comparing the results obtained with the ones found in the North American market, multiple 
discrepancies where found as also some bonding points. Contrasting with US, premiums are on 
average superior when one party involved is financially unconstrained. This finding is 
observable when the target or bidder are unconstrained, which differs from the US market 
where the bidder’s financial constrained showed to have no significant impact. Regarding the 
target CAR, no concise conclusion was able to retrieve since different indicators yielded 
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different results. In line with the studies conducted in United States, bidders have greater CAR 
whenever there is a party financially constrained. 
 
3. Regression analysis  
In this section, the relevance of financial constraints on the realized gains from takeovers is 
observed on both targets’ and bidders’ groups. The statistical study carried out, aimed at 
exploring if the existence of financial constraints on bidders or targets influences the value at 
which the deal was concluded and abnormal returns with ceteris paribus conclusions.   




The above-mentioned regression was utilized to study different measures surrounding each 
deal. Yi stands in one interpretation for the premium realized within the transaction, as a 
percentage, and in the following two variations as the CAR experienced for the bidder and 
target correspondingly. TFCi (TNFCi) is a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 if in the 
observation i the target company is yielded as financially constrained (unconstrained). 
Consistently, BFCi (BNFCi) is a dummy variable that assumes the value of 1 if in the 
observation i the target company is yielded as financially constrained (unconstrained). Xk,i 
denotes for a plurality of control variables that have shown in previous literature to be correlated 
with the behaviour of the different parties involved in the transaction (diversifying acquisitions, 
hostile acquisitions, the logarithm of the bidder total assets bidder size, the relative size of the 
two entities assets (relative size), in case the company was purchase entirely in cash (All in 
cash) or in stock (All in stock)). In addition, it was opted to insert in this regression the control 
variable (Percentage Sought) to investigate whether obtaining a totalitarian position, once the 
transaction is completed, induces relevant changes in the transaction behaviour for both parties 
involved. To further mitigate the risk of wrongheaded results, additional control variables were 
utilized: (recession) to regulate possible business cycles interferences, Tobin’s Q and the ratio 
of free cash flow over the book value of assets (for both parties involved). Finally, to control 
for specific market characteristics that might be present and influential, three additional sets of 
dummy variables were included. To minimize the influence of transaction multiples, that 
fluctuate according to different periods, Year dummy variable was added and minimising 
sectorial effects both at a geographical spectrum and specialization practices, Bidder Country 





Ordinary least squares regression for the model above described, where Yi stands for the 
premium of the transaction in section A, target’ CAR in section B and to bidder’ CAR in section 
C. Standard errors were tested for robustness and bidders were clustered according to their 
DataStream identification. P-values are reported in brackets next to the parameter estimates. 
For improved visualization, *, **, *** denotes respectively a 10%, 5% and 1% significance 
level. 
 
Section A – Premium (%)     
 Composite I 
Index 
Payout Ratio KZ HP 
TFC -5.340 -7.949 -8.235 -4.186 
 [0.155] [0.361] [0.374] [0.306] 
TNFC 4.719 -3.974 4.322 3.283 
 [0.200] [0.172] [0.275] [0.364] 
BFC 15.065 12.911 6.911 14.004 
 [0.228] [0.253] [0.143] [0.165] 
BNFC 7.991 1.737 -5.002 -0.317 
 [0.217] [0.884] [0.271] [0.991] 
Diversifying 2.591 4.009 6.121 -4.918 
 [0.328] [0.550] [0.502] [0.486] 
Hostile 16.171 -2.778 0.000 0.000 
 [0.442] [0.870] [0.000] [0.000] 
Percentage Sought -0.008 -0.067 0.248 0.250 
 [0.332] [0.811] [0.164] [0.225] 
All in cash -16.185* -18.103** -16.665* -17.316* 
 [0.078] [0.046] [0.081] [0.063] 
All in stock -13.821* -14.078* -14.832 -14.695* 
 [0.061] [0.072] [0.102] [0.081] 
Relative size 7.633*** 7.482*** 2.884 10.043*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.154] [0.000] 
Bidder size 24.670*** 24.246*** -3.193 28.377*** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.820] [0.000] 
Recession 5.511* 3.628 3.791 5.188 
 [0.073] [0.221] [0.394] [0.665] 
T-Tobin’s Q -0.007 -0.007 0.083** 0.060 
 [0.264] [0.280] [0.037] [0.151] 
B-Tobin’s Q 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.626] [0.905] [0.706] [0.641] 
T-FCF/TA -1.433 -1.351 -0.617 0.168 
 [0.289] [0.293] [0.819] [0.948] 
B-FCF/TA 0.712 0.763 4.046 5.469** 
 [0.292] [0.205] [0.102] [0.048] 
Constant 55.459*** 57.256*** 47.195*** 55.344*** 
 [0.007] [0.006] [0.008] [0.003] 
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Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bidder Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bidder Country 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diff. (TFC-TNFC) -10.059 -3.975 -12.557 -7.469 
Diff. (BFC-BNFC) 7.074 11.174 11.913 14.321 
Adj. R-squared 0.076 0.089 0.082 0.087 
No. of observations 319 307 209 206 
 
Section B – Target CAR (%)    
 Composite I 
Index 
Payout Ratio KZ HP 
TFC 5.425* 8.178 3.601* 4.441** 
 [0.063] [0.205] [0.082] [0.048] 
TNFC -0.181 -0.770 2.505 3.672 
 [0.874] [0.687] [0.365] [0.186] 
BFC 1.607 -8.154** -9.504 -6.917* 
 [0.727] [0.044] [0.353] [0.100] 
BNFC 4.829* 3.267 -11.195* 0.349 
 [0.092] [0.588] [0.090] [0.883] 
Diversifying -5.810* -5.368 -3.501 -2.582 
 [0.075] [0.110] [0.399] [0.571] 
Hostile 13.710* 6.862 0.000 0.000 
 [0.053] [0.430] [0.000] [0.000] 
Percentage Sought 0.054 -0.710 0.082 -0.043 
 [0.683] [0.571] [0.501] [0.784] 
All in cash 5.288** 4.933* 6.002** 5.673** 
 [0.044] [0.078] [0.025] [0.033] 
All in stock -2.457** -2.361 -2.749* -3.217* 
 [0.042] [0.163] [0.091] [0.063] 
Relative size -3.192*** -3.044*** -3.100*** -2.895** 
 [0.005] [0.009] [0.006] [0.037] 
Bidder size -1.586 -1.942 -2.160 -0.623 
 [0.589] [0.505] [0.394] [0.859] 
Recession 2.571 9.675** 7.692 3.334 
 [0.436] [0.018] [0.103] [0.705] 
T-Tobin’s Q 0.000 0.000 -0.035 -0.038* 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.113] [0.065] 
B-Tobin’s Q 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
T-FCF/TA 0.703 0.623 0.820 0.463 
 [0.146] [0.228] [0.480] [0.675] 
B-FCF/TA -0.372 -0.341 -1.809 -1.232 
 [0.447] [0.494] [0.141] [0.274] 
Constant 11.898 11.496 10.347 6.713 
 [0.313] [0.328] [0.149] [0.394] 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bidder Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Bidder Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diff. (TFC-TNFC) 5.606 8.618 1.096 0.769 
Diff. (BFC-BNFC) -3.222 -11.421 1.691 -7.266 
Adj. R-squared 0.123 0.134 0.174 0.179 
No. of observations 319 307 209 206 
 
Section C – Bidder CAR    
 Composite I 
Index 
Payout Ratio KZ HP 
TFC 4.984*** 0.829 2.777* -3.019 
 [0.005] [0.675] [0.092] [0.270] 
TNFC 0.166 -1.380 -1.639 -1.160 
 [0.932] [0.482] [0.567] [0.674] 
BFC 1.019 3.276* 0.057 4.787** 
 [0.564] [0.055] [0.961] [0.047] 
BNFC 0.448 0.815 7.421 -1.319 
 [0.741] [0.706] [0.146] [0.572] 
Diversifying -0.359 -0.241 -2.644** -2.706** 
 [0.747] [0.833] [0.031] [0.042] 
Hostile -7.514 -17.177** 0.000 0.000 
 [0.437] [0.049] [0.000] [0.000] 
Percentage Sought -0.009 0.027 0.051 0.052 
 [0.845] [0.517] [0.327] [0.229] 
All in cash 0.836* 1.106 0.958 1.224* 
 [0.090] [0.181] [0.121] [0.082] 
All in stock -0.703 -1.981 -0.431 -0.105 
 [0.188] [0.539] [0.381] [0.885] 
Relative size -0.145 0.260 0.147 0.093 
 [0.643] [0.398] [0.703] [0.771] 
Bidder size -0.888 -0.304 -0.768 0.128 
 [0.388] [0.755] [0.545] [0.844] 
Recession 1.060 3.531 4.374 6.986 
 [0.745] [0.281] [0.244] [0.269] 
T-Tobin’s Q -0.001 0.467 -0.001 0.011 
 [0.308] [0.392] [0.356] [0.423] 
B-Tobin’s Q 0.000 0.132 0.000 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.407] [0.000] [0.000] 
T-FCF/TA -0.184 6.333 -0.195 0.348 
 [0.563] [0.427] [0.525] [0.626] 
B-FCF/TA 0.141 1.494 0.219 0.221 
 [0.370] [0.704] [0.285] [0.706] 
Constant -5.927 -4.294 -2.512 -2.293 
 [0.313] [0.328] [0.149] [0.394] 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bidder Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bidder Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diff. (TFC-TNFC) 4.818 2.209 4.416 -1.859 
Diff. (BFC-BNFC) 0.571 2.461 -7.364 6.106 
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Adj. R-squared 0.063 0.049 0.044 0.061 
No. of observations 319 307 209 206 
 
The outcome of the regressions conducted are shown in Panel IV. The Panel IV is divided into 
three sections, being in section A the acquisition premium study conducted and in the sections 
B and C, the target abnormal and bidder abnormal return are overviewed respectively across 
the four indicators of financial constraints. At the end of each section, it is incorporated the 
difference between the dummy variables coefficients retrieved for indicating the level of 
financial constrain.  
Contrasting with the findings obtained in the US market, in the European region, unconstrained 
targets seem to be subject of higher premiums (section A). Although no dummy variable 
(TFC/TFNC) proved to be statistically significant at the desired confidence intervals, the 
difference between indicators indicate such possible deduction on the four indicators utilized. 
Overviewing the role of bidder financial constraints, we are faced with the same limitations as 
in the analysis of the target, regarding the statistical significance of the coefficients obtained. 
Having this fact established, there is again a tendency present that suggests that bidders who 
are constrained pursue higher acquisition premiums, which could be a signal of the winner’s 
curse. However, such conclusions cannot be made without having an in-depth investigation at 
the follow-up period after the acquisition announcement. Overall, the study on the transaction 
premium was not successful, as the coefficients that were being the object of study are not 
statistically significant in any indicator utilized. 
Section B reports the second measure that this study explored, target materialized gains from 
the acquisitions. The latter is captured through target abnormal returns in the selected time 
window, [-5; +5] days, surrounding the announcement date. In three out of four measures, apart 
from Payout Ratio, the fact that the target is considered constrained, generates a positive 
abnormal return upon announcement. Pointing out the HP indicator, whenever the target is 
considered financial constraint, keeping everything else constant, the target company 
experiences an abnormal return of 4.44% with a p-value inferior of 5%. Overlooking the 
importance of the bidders’ financial situation, some puzzling results were verified, as the KZ 
index showed results that are negatively correlated to the other measures. This materialization 
was already pointed out in previous literature (Almeida, Campello, & Weishbach, 2004). From 
our regression results, according to the Payout ratio and HP, when the bidder is financial 
constraint the target tends to observe a negative abnormal return, ceteris paribus, -8.15% and -
6.92% respectively, being these results significant at a 5% and 10% significance level 
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respectively. Inversely, whenever the acquirer is tagged as unconstrained, as reported by 
Composite I index the target observes a positive abnormal return. In contrast, the KZ index 
indicates the opposite is (negative return), both at a 10% significance level.  
Section C observes the reaction on the other side of the negotiation table by addressing the 
bidder’ abnormal return upon deal announcement. In two of the measures, Composite I Index 
and in KZ index whenever the target is considered financial constraint the bidder realizes 
positive abnormal returns. Other things being equal, a bidder according to Composite I Index 
realizes a 4.98% higher abnormal return with a p-value of 0.5% when bidding for a constrained 
company. In line with Section B, the level of financial constraint at the bidder level, also proven 
to be relevant on the materialized acquirer abnormal returns. In consonance with the Payout 
Ratio and HP index, the acquirer when is financial constrained observes a positive excess return 
when completes an acquisition. From our regression results, according to the Payout ratio and 
HP, when the bidder is financial constraint, the bidder tends to observe a positive abnormal 
return, ceteris paribus, 3.28% and 4.79% respectively, being these results significant at a 10% 
and 5% significance level respectively.  
These results could impel that these acquirers may choose more carefully, which targets they 
are going to purchase. According to the literature prevailing nowadays, under perfect capital 
markets, the management team should undertake all projects whose net present value is 
positive. If no budget restrictions where established, all initiatives should be accepted until the 
subsequent project has a null added value. However, the reality experienced by the investment 
board of companies can evade the aforementioned propositions. This fact is augmented if the 
company is perceived to be under financial distress situation. Creditors and shareholders urge 
to take a risk averse position when confronted with capital demand for new project financing, 
increasing therefore the discount rate applied. Thus, managers opt to propose only the projects 
that provide the greatest rate of return. The multiple capital market players can commend this 
possible behaviour approach, which ultimately leads to underinvestment. Instigating a 
confidence boost, resulting in a positive reaction upon the announcement acquisition. 
Analysing the results of section B and C, predominantly the degree of financial constraints on 
acquired corporations indicates to perform a relevant part in influencing abnormal returns for 
both sides of the negotiation table, going in accordance with the findings existent in the current 
literature. 
Overseeing the impact that the control variables implemented have in the multiple dependent 
variables, the results obtained to go in line with the discoveries made by previous authors. 
Whenever an acquisition was considered to be a diversifying move, it post a negative impact 
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on the target abnormal return (Gondhalekar, Sant, & Ferris, 2004) and bidders’ abnormal return 
(Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990). Thus can be related to probable feared cross-border effects 
(Moeller & Schlingemann, 2005), conceivable agency problems resulting in culture clashes 
(Roll, 1986) & (Denis & McConnell, 2003) or/and managerial motivation to build 
conglomerates (Amihud & Lev, 1981). Focusing on hostile takeovers, it provided positive 
abnormal returns to target companies (Bange & Mazzeo, 2004) & (Comment & Schwert, 1995) 
& (Schwert G. W., 2000), while penalizing the bidders’ group (Hubbard & Palia, 1999).   
The initiative taken to include the percentage sought as a control variable failed to provide 
meaningful results across all three measures. On the other hand, controlling for the ratio of size 
between both parties involved proved to be significant across the premium on the transaction 
and the target abnormal return. Whenever the target size is greater in proportion to the bidders 
will be relatively more detrimental to target shareholders, as the acquisition of a larger target 
will induce greater management entrenchment (Mulherin & Boone, 2000). A puzzling 
observation emerged when it was observed that contrarily to the US market, the higher the 
relative size ratio is the acquisition premium will also be higher. This contrasting point could 
be driven by the controlling premium that is charged in consolidation strategies among market 
players with similar size or when a smaller player integrates a larger company. Controlling 
independently for the size of the bidder, evidence was found that the enlargement of the acquirer 
size induces higher transaction premiums (Moeller, Schlingemann, & Stulz, 2004). 
Regarding the chosen payment method, acquisitions paid fully by cash are related to lower 
premiums than if they were financed through full stock payments being in both cases a decrease 
in premium, keeping everything else constant (Wansley, Lane, & Yang, 1983). When analysing 
the target abnormal returns, cash payments induces a positive abnormal return whilst stock 
payments tend to penalize the return obtained by the acquired entity shareholders (Loughran & 
Vijh, 1997) & (Cai, Song, & Walking, 2011). On the bidder side, only acquisitions that were 
paid fully by cash were statistical significant, being the coefficient positive (Huang & Walking, 
1987) & (Franks, Harris, & Titman, 1991). 
During recession cycles, the analysis conducted, shown that during these periods, it induced 
greater premiums, perhaps due to the augmentation of information asymmetry between bidders 
and targets (Fralich & Papadopoulos, 2018). The second spectrum where it proved to be 
statistical significant is on target abnormal return enabling a positive variation (Hovakimian, 
2011) promoting the advantages of in-house financing when facing the existence of external 
markets glitches.  
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Controlling for possible overvaluation existing in the market, the acquired firm’ Tobin Q proved 
to be inflate the transaction premium, indicating that companies who are trading at greater 
valuations, require the bidder to settle the transaction at a higher control premium  (Lang, Stulz, 
& Walking, 1989). Nevertheless, greater target’s Tobin Q diminish target’s CAR. In addition, 
a raise in the bidder free cash flow also increases the premium (Lang, Stulz, & Walking, 1991). 
 
4. Robustness tests 
4.1 Propensity score matching 
One problem that is intrinsic with most regression studies is bonded to the endogeneity problem 
that can prompt the refutation of any conclusions that were made previously. A root cause in 
this study conducted, is inherent to acquirer’s role and opportunities on offer. Possible 
discrepancies within the bidders may influence their preferred acquisitions when comparing 
constrained or unconstrained targets, while those same characteristics may drive the settled 
transaction premium. Being that the case encountered, then the results obtained would be 
motivated by bidder characteristics in lieu of target attributes. 
In order to contemplate such possibility, the propensity score matching proposed by 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983) was the instrument utilized to test for possible endogeneity 
problems. In order to undertake such methodology, one must collect a group of acquisitions 
that present no discernible differences on the acquirer and deal characteristics between them, in 
order to isolate the target constrained (treated group) and unconstrained targets (control group). 
Subsequently, transaction premiums and abnormal returns to both sides of the agreement can 
be compared on the two isolated groups. The hypothesis that should be corrupted is that due to 
the similar deal and acquirer characteristics, the tested measures should provide 
indistinguishable results. Due to this procedure for classifying observations, where the target 
company was not considered constrained neither unconstrained, were removed. 
The bundle of deals collected were matched on a single scalar propensity score that 
comprehends the likelihood of a being classified as a constrained target (treated group) 
considering the bidder and deal specificities. The attributes established to determine identical 
acquirers were (degree of financial constraint, Tobin’s Q and the ratio of free cash flow over 
total assets) and deal features (diversifying transaction, hostile transaction, payment method, 
recession period dummy and the relative size of acquirer to target). Panel V illustrates the results 
obtained for the means of the control and treat groups across the three different measures. In 
section A, the effect is tested on the targets’ classification variation and on section B the test is 




Section A: influence of target’s financial position on premiums and abnormal returns: 
propensity score matching. To build this panel, a bundle of transactions was selected that 
presented no sizable dissimilarities in acquirer and transaction features, comparing then the 
constrained targets (TFC) with unconstrained targets (TNFC). P-values are reported in brackets 
next to the parameter estimates. For improved visualization, *, **, *** denotes respectively a 
10%, 5% and 1% significance level. 
  Composite I  Payout Ratio  KZ  HP 
Premium (%) Diff. -17.535*  7.061  -22.106**  1.913 
 p -Value [0.087]  [0.483]  [0.045]  [0.840] 
         
TCAR (%) Diff. 3.410*  2.776  -0.469  9.061* 
 p -Value [0.072]  [0.185]  [0.938]  [0.067] 
         
BCAR (%) Diff. 5.142***  1.634  2.966  2.274 
 p -Value [0.004]  [0.335]  [0.147]  [0.197] 
 
Section B: influence of acquirer’s financial position on premiums and abnormal returns: 
propensity score matching. To build this panel, a bundle of transactions was selected that 
presented no sizable dissimilarities in target and transaction features, comparing then the 
constrained bidders (BFC) with unconstrained bidders (BNFC). P-values are reported in 
brackets next to the parameter estimates. For improved visualization, *, **, *** denotes 
respectively a 10%, 5% and 1% significance level. 
  Composite I  Payout Ratio  KZ  HP 
Premium (%) Diff. 11.043  10.115  8.321  -2.789 
 p -Value [0.483]  [0.431]  [0.541]  [0.792] 
         
TCAR (%) Diff. -10.589  1.844  -0.226  -4.484 
 p -Value [0.202]  [0.775]  [0.982]  [0.205] 
         
BCAR (%) Diff. -0.908  -3.805  -1.046  -1.822 




Once the propensity score matching was carry out, valuable observations can be retrieved from. 
The findings obtained despite not being statistically significant across the four measures, 
indicate that the differences in average values of the desired indicators of value creation, 
premium and abnormal returns to both parties, go in line with the multivariate analysis 
conducted in chapter 3. Emphasizing Composite I, the average excess return experienced by 
bidders is 5.14% higher whenever the target is regarded financially constraint, being this 
difference statistically significant with a p-value inferior to 0.01. This result induces the 
aforementioned conclusion, that once the acquirer and transaction features are controlled for 
econometrically, the gains experienced by it are propelled by the financial constraint status of 
the target entity.  
To further certificate whether this condition could be spurious, in section B of Panel V, the 
methodology was conducted but on a symmetrical perspective. Contrarily, the deals where 
compared for those that encompass a constrained acquirer (treated group) with unconstrained 
acquirers (control group) keeping constant the target and deal specificities. These findings 
culminate in a failure of the effect played by the bidders’ financial condition on an acquisition. 
Concerns may rise given the fact that the regression conducted in chapter 3 can be 
overemphasizing the effect of acquirer financial status on acquisitions. 
Comprehending the information provided with this analysis, propensity score matching 
corroborates further the indication, that presence/absence of financial constraints on the 
acquired entity, affects the value appreciation on the transaction.  
 
4.2 Estimation Window 
In order to see to what extent the methodology adopted was relevant, and the conclusions 
retrieved were not applicable just to set of restrictions imposed, a second analysis was 
conducted. Besides the propensity score matching, the verification conducted was to validate 
the accuracy of the same study but focusing on the time window [-3; +3] days upon deal 
announcement. The panels with the regression results are presented in Appendix II, being the 
target and bidder abnormal return analysed in section A and B respectively. 
All in all, when we overview the results, it was found that the conclusions remain unaltered 
using event windows ending three days after the announcement date instead of the fifth day 
following the acquisition decision. 
Both these initiatives diminished largely the possibility that the effects observed with the 
analysis conducted so far could be spurious by an external factor not captured in the 




With economy entering in a deep financial crisis originated by the Covid-19 virus, a surge of 
mergers and acquisitions is expected to arise in the multiple sectors in the economy once the 
recession peak is overtaken. This come at time that in the European region many companies 
were still undergoing the recovering process from the latest financial crisis. The effect of 
financial constraints on the multiple interactions existing in the market is becoming 
progressively a studied topic by the academics. The accurate measurement of those indicators 
can inform more competently the society for the impact that different macroeconomic cycles 
can have, enabling the multiple stakeholders to prepare themselves with enhanced strategic 
plans. 
Focusing merely on the value creation, the potential hidden underneath companies that are 
under financial constraints is becoming more a focus point on the investor agenda, as the 
materialization of such value is perceived increasingly attainable. 
For the analysis conducted, a sample of European acquisitions data was collected for the period 
encompassed between 1985 and 2019, covering within multiple economic cycles. Resorting to 
a multiplicity of financial constraints indicators, it was possible to separate the companies 
considered unconstrained and constrained. Henceforth, the impact of financial constraints was 
analysed on the gains realized upon the acquisition announcement on the bidder and target 
groups. 
This dissertation, contributes with direct manifestations, that on the whole, acquisition of 
constrained entities are value-magnifying initiatives for acquirers as well as targets. Target 
abnormal returns are superior and statistically significant higher when targets are financially 
constraint. Likewise, bidders experience superior returns when targets are financial constraint, 
as the sphere of prospective valuable initiatives is perceived to be superior and current 
uncharted profitable projects are attainable. Recurring to the M&A process, acquired companies 
may encounter their access to external and internal capital markets augmented/facilitated. This 
will ultimately unlock the projects embraceable, propelling investment and decreasing 
investment-cash flow sensitiveness, among other effects (Erel, Jang, & Weisbach, 2015).  
Contradictorily to the US market, on a univariate analyse, where the firms that were considered 
financial unconstrained shown to have higher acquisition premiums. On some indicators, in the 
European region, unconstrained targets were subject to higher acquisition premiums. This 
failure in consensus does not allow retrieving righteous conclusions, however the factors 
driving such behaviour should be inspiration for further investigations. Sustaining the indefinite 
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conclusions, on a univariate analysis, financial constraints showed no significant effect impact 
on the acquisition premium on a multivariate analysis model. 
The dissertation undertaken provides a valuable perspective of what is regarded to be a very 
opaque event, since many times the drivers behind the acquisition process are ambiguous for 
the various market players. The different instruments utilized, managed to assess the impact 
financial constraints have on the M&A mechanism. The results obtained complement the 
literature existent on M&A and financial constraints, providing insightful information of the 
European region practices.  
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Appendix I: Variable Definitions 




All firms in the extracted database were organized based on size, interest 
coverage ratio, dividend payout ratio, and the KZ index separately. Once the 
desired ratios are computed, companies are assigned a score of 0 to 5 for each 
distribution. In order to a company to be considered under this composite, it 
must be possible to retrieve at least three of the above mentioned four criteria 
for that entity. The next step regards the attribution of an overall score to each 
firm, weighted average ranks, being the weights attribution based on the 
number of available components.  
The lower the overall score, it implies the company to be under higher the 
financial constraints. Finally, the firms above the 70th percentile classified as 
unconstrained companies while the firms below the 30th percentile classified 
as financially constrained companies. 
Composite 
II Index 
The principles of allocating companies to the financial constrained or 
unconstrained group in this indicator are equal to Composite I Index, being the 
only modification relying on the fact that this composite dismisses KZ index 
and size for the ranking’s allocation. 
Payout 
Ratio 
Taking into consideration “(Hubbard & Palia, 1999), Dividend payout ratio is 
defined as the two-year average of the dividend payout ratio from the 
preceding annual reports at each point in time. Payout ratio is defined as the 
sum of dividend plus stock repurchases divided by operating income as in 
(Jagannathan, Stephens, & Weisbach, 2000)”. 
Regarding limits imposed, payout ratio assumes the value of 1 if the extracted 
value is superior to 1 or if the firm in question reports a negative operating 
income and distributes dividends nonetheless, (Hadlock & Pierce, 2010). 
Once we calculated the past two years’ distribution ratio for the entities 
existent in our dataset, observations were ranked accordingly to this value 
within the [0,5] range with 5 signifying the utmost unconstrained entities (by 
having the maximum distribution percentage) in order to be in accordance 
with the above-mentioned measures. Firms above the 70th percentile classified 
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as unconstrained companies while firms below the 30th percentile are labelled 
as financially constrained companies. 
KZ Index This measure was initially proposed by (Lamont, Polk, & Saaá-Requejo, 
2001). In the formula CashFlow represents the ratio of the entity’ cash flow 
over the preceding year amount of PPE. Tobin’sQ is Tobin’s Q and Leverage  
represents total debt divided by the sum of the latter plus value of shareholder’s 
equity. Dividends embodies the ratio of the sum of dividends and stock 
repurchases over the preceding year amount of PPE. CashHolding denotes the 
entity’s capital ownings, extracted as the ratio of cash and short-term 
investments over the preceding year amount of PPE. 
KZindex = -1.002*CashFlow + 0.283*Q + 3.139*Leverage -
39.368*Dividends -1.315*CashHoldings 
Like in the previous variables, and in order to maintain the consistency in our 
approach, once the KZ index is extracted for the totality of companies in our 
sample, observations were ranked accordingly to this value within the [0,5] 
range with 5 signifying the utmost unconstrained entities (by having the top 
KZ index). Firms above the 70th percentile are labelled as unconstrained 
companies while firms below the 30th percentile are labelled as financially 
constrained companies. 
HP Index This measure is in accordance to the proposal by (Hadlock & Pierce, 2010):  
“HP= -0.737*Size + 0.043*Size2 – 0.040*Age 
where Size is the logarithm of the book value of assets (AT) and Age is the 
length of time (in years) since the company become publicly listed on 
DataStream. Just like the authors proposed, Size is winsorized at (the log of) 
$4.5 billion and Age at 37 years”. To account for inflation, size is corrected for 
inflation levels for the respective CPI level from the OECD region, being the 
index values retrieved from the institution website. Once the HP index is 
extracted for the totally of companies in our sample, observations were ranked 
accordingly to this value within the [0,5] range with 5 signifying the utmost 
unconstrained entities (by having the top HP index). Firms above the 70th 
percentile classified as unconstrained companies while firms below the 30th 





Variable  Definition  
Premium As the author (Officer, 2003) defined: “The aggregate amount of each form 
of payment offered to target shareholders (cash, equity, debt, etc.)” divided by 
the market value of the target 43 days prior to the bid announcement 
multiplied by the sought sake. As long as the value extracted belongs to the 
range [0,2], no alterations are made. If that is not the case, the ratio of “the 
final (and then the initial) price per share of target stock offered by the bidder” 
belongs to the range [0,2], no alterations are made. If none restrictions are 




“Cumulative target percentage abnormal return in a [-5, +5] time window 




“Cumulative bidder percentage abnormal return in a [-5, +5] time window 
adjacent the acquisition announcement.”  (Khatami, Marchica, & Mura, 2015) 
Total Assets 
(€m) 
“Total assets.”  (Khatami, Marchica, & Mura, 2015) 
Sales (€m) “Total sales.”  (Khatami, Marchica, & Mura, 2015) 
Cost of debt Cost of Debt is computed by dividing the Interest Expense by the average of 
the Total debt from the preceding two years. 
Coverage 
ratio 




“Is the ratio of the sum of Long-Term and Current Debt divided by Common 
Shares Outstanding times the price at the end of the year.” 
Tobin’s Q From (Hadlock & Pierce, 2010), “Tobin’s Q: Total Assets minus Common 




From (Hadlock & Pierce, 2010), it is computed as the “ratio between Cash 
and Short-Term Investments divided by the lagged value of Property, Plant 
and Equipment.” 
CapEx/TA “Capital Expenditure normalized by lagged value of Total Assets.”  (Khatami, 





“Property, Plant and Equipment normalized by Total Assets.” 
FCF/TA Free Cash Flows normalized by Total Assets; It is the ratio of the Operating 
Income Before Depreciation minus Gross Interest Expense minus preferred 
Dividends minus Common Dividend, divided by Total Assets. 
Trans. 
Value (€m) 
Value of Transaction in € million retrieved from Thomson One Investment 
Banking platform 
Diversifying “Dummy equal to 1 if bidder and target have different 2-digit SIC codes.”  
(Khatami, Marchica, & Mura, 2015) 
Hostile “Dummy equal to 1 if TOIB reports the acquisition to be hostile.”  (Khatami, 
Marchica, & Mura, 2015) 
All in Cash “Dummy equal to 1 if TOIB reports the acquisition to be fully settled in cash”  
(Khatami, Marchica, & Mura, 2015) 
All in stock “Dummy equal to 1 if TOIB reports the acquisition to be fully settled in 
stocks”  (Khatami, Marchica, & Mura, 2015) 
Relative 
size 
“Natural logarithm of target total assets divided by bidder total assets”  
(Khatami, Marchica, & Mura, 2015) 
Recession Dummy takes the value of 1 if the deal was announced in the following years: 
1982, 1983, 1993, 2002, 2003, 2008, 2009 and 2010, according to (Patterns 
of Euro Area and US macroeconomic cycles - what has been different this 





From (Palepu, 1986), corresponds to the “ratio of Long-Term Debt divided by 
the sum of Preferred and Common Equity averaged over the three fiscal years 
prior to the acquisition announcement.” 
Size “Total Assets in €m.” (Khatami, Marchica, & Mura, 2015) 
Market to 
book 
From (Palepu, 1986), it is the “ratio of the market value of the common equity 




From (Billett & Xue, 2007), it corresponds to the “ ratio of Plant, Property and 
Equipment divided by Total Assets averaged over the three fiscal years prior 





Appendix II: Robustness Panels 
Ordinary least squares regression for the model above described, where Yi stands for target’ 
CAR over the time window [-3; +3] surrounding the announcement date in section A, to bidder’ 
CAR over the time window [-3; +3] surrounding the announcement in section B. Standard 
errors were tested for robustness and bidders were clustered according to their DataStream 
identification. P-values are reported in brackets next to the parameter estimates. For improved 
visualization, *, **, *** denotes respectively a 10%, 5% and 1% significance level. 
 
Section A - Target CAR (%)    
 Composite I 
Index 
Payout Ratio KZ HP 
TFC 3.626* 3.184 4.242* 1.842 
 [0.096] [0.507] [0.052] [0.680] 
TNFC -0.278 -0.715 1.137 3.672 
 [0.597] [0.885] [0.428] [0.321] 
BFC 1.122 -7.812** -9.504 -6.917* 
 [0.857] [0.060] [0.353] [0.100] 
BNFC 3.037* -0.803 -11.195* 2.896 
 [0.064] [0.890] [0.090] [0.838] 
Diversifying -5.981** -6.256** -5.171 -4.879 
 [0.041] [0.042] [0.152] [0.235] 
Hostile -14.435** -10.151 0.000 0.000 
 [0.036] [0.250] [0.000] [0.000] 
Percentage Sought 0.055 0.073 -0.056 -0.034 
 [0.655] [0.536] [0.695] [0.815] 
All in cash 5.788** 6.512** 5.955** 5.872* 
 [0.034] [0.025] [0.033] [0.062] 
All in stock -2.957** -2.316* -2.377* -2.843* 
 [0.046] [0.061] [0.077] [0.052] 
Relative size -2.884*** -2.869*** -3.018*** -2.663** 
 [0.005] [0.007] [0.002] [0.031] 
Bidder size -1.073 -0.771 -1.648 -1.258 
 [0.698] [0.957] [0.551] [0.550] 
Recession 2.895 7.705 8.003* 7.042 
 [0.399] [0.133] [0.089] [0.312] 
T-Tobin’s Q -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.037** -0.037** 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.039] [0.026] 
B-Tobin’s Q 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] 
T-FCF/TA 0.837* 0.663 0.520 0.406 
 [0.086] [0.194] [0.586] [0.668] 
B-FCF/TA -0.422 -0.325 -1.018 -0.608 
 [0.381] [0.488] [0.325] [0.516] 
Constant 12.809 12.747 12.053 13.548 
 [0.340] [0.272] [0.437] [0.495] 
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Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bidder Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bidder Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Diff. (TFC-TNFC) 3.904 3.899 3.105 -1.830 
Diff. (BFC-BNFC) -1.915 -7.009 1.691 -9.813 
Adj. R-squared 0.130 0.121 0.203 0.209 
No. of observations 319 307 209 206 
 
Section B - Bidder CAR    
 Composite I 
Index 
Payout Ratio KZ HP 
TFC -2.470* 0.619 1.745* 3.181** 
 [0.081] [0.648] [0.481] [0.028] 
TNFC -0.475 -0.178 -1.471 -1.231 
 [0.771] [0.902] [0.370] [0.565] 
BFC -0.140 -1.949 1.409 0.142 
 [0.932] [0.150] [0.586] [0.886] 
BNFC -1.338 0.337 1.263 12.289*** 
 [0.160] [0.838] [0.412] [0.010] 
Diversifying 0.336 0.307 -1.297 -1.391 
 [0.722] [0.758] [0.222] [0.199] 
Hostile 7.205 2.427 0.000 0.000 
 [0.090] [0.607] [0.000] [0.000] 
Percentage Sought 0.011 0.022 0.061 0.053 
 [0.764] [0.550] [0.074] [0.180] 
All in cash 0.836* 0.958 1.224* 1.041 
 [0.090] [0.121] [0.082] [0.157] 
All in stock -0.703 -0.431 -0.105 -0.352 
 [0.188] [0.381] [0.885] [0.410] 
Relative size -0.112 0.056 -0.055 0.023 
 [0.651] [0.826] [0.813] [0.940] 
Bidder size 0.288 0.098 0.698 0.506 
 [0.744] [0.915] [0.221] [0.649] 
Recession -0.119 0.149 5.840 4.499 
 [0.952] [0.947] [0.364] [0.115] 
T-Tobin’s Q 0.000 0.000 0.010 0.010 
 [0.902] [0.948] [0.392] [0.372] 
B-Tobin’s Q 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000*** 
 [0.141] [0.185] [0.236] [0.002] 
T-FCF/TA -0.219 -0.219 0.186 0.082 
 [0.361] [0.357] [0.754] [0.875] 
B-FCF/TA 0.175 0.117 0.260 0.416 
 [0.211] [0.488] [0.607] [0.362] 
Constant -3.286 -2.013 -4.074* -6.097* 
 [0.644] [0.478] [0.094] [0.070] 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bidder Industry Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bidder Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Diff. (TFC-TNFC) -1.995 0.797 3.216 4.412 
Diff. (BFC-BNFC) 1.198 -2.286 0.146 -12.147 
Adj. R-squared 0.050 0.092 0.041 0.023 
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